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Same-Sex Marriages and Civil Unions: On Meaning,
Free Exercise, and Constitutional Guarantees
Mark Strasser*

I. INTRODUCTION

Recently, the state of Vermont recognized civil unions, a marriagelike status that affords qualifying same-sex couples all of the rights and
responsibilities of marriage. Reactions to the creation of this status
have ranged across a wide spectrum. Some suggest that Vermont has
not gone far enough because the state might instead have permitted
same-sex couples to marry; 1 others suggest that the state has struck
exactly the right balance by affording same-sex couples the rights and
responsibilities of marriage while at the same time reserving marriage
for different-sex couples; 2 and still others suggest that the state has
taken steps which will lead to the destruction of marriage and the
family.3 This range of reactions was not unexpected, and any other
state considering the creation of civil union status should expect an
equally broad range of views among its citizens, although the
percentage of citizens holding any one view would presumably vary
from state to state.

* Professor of Law, Capital University Law School.
B.A., Harvard College, M.S., Ph.D.,
University of Chicago, J.D., Stanford Law School.
1. See, e.g., Barbara J. Cox, But Why Not Marriage:An Essay on Vermont's Civil Unions
Law, Same-Sex Marriage,and Separate But (Un)Equal, 25 VT. L. REV. 113, 135 (2000) ("Not
until same-sex couples obtain the freedom to marry will what remains 'a condition of legal
inferiority' be lifted from us."); Michael Mello, For Today, I'm Gay: The Unfinished Battle for
Same-Sex Marriage in Vermont, 25 VT. L. REV. 149, 251 (2000) ("I believe that any parallel
matrimonial system of domestic partnership would, by its very existence, be separate-and
therefore unequal-because it would implicitly mark same-sex couples with a badge of
inferiority.").
2. See generally Greg Johnson, Vermont Civil Unions: The New Language of Marriage, 25
VT. L. REV. 15 (2000) (claiming that lesbian and gay couples have finally won equal marriage
rights).
3. See generally Gerard V. Bradley, Same-Sex Marriage: Our Final Answer? 14 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 729 (2000) (suggesting that the recognition of civil unions may
lead to the recognition of same-sex marriage, which would hurt the institution of marriage).
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There is no single explanation for the vastly differing reactions to
same-sex unions, although it is safe to assume that those responses are
based in part on differing views regarding the nature, meaning, and
purposes of marriage. These views differ radically, both within and
across perspectives. Thus, not only does Vermont's recognition of
same-sex unions contradict the teachings of some religions regarding
permissible and impermissible relationships, but also the teachings of
some religions contradict the teachings of other religions regarding that
subject. Recognizing that diversity of opinion exists both within and
across perspectives is important, both because it undercuts the
legitimacy of the claim that the same-sex marriage issue is basically a
debate between religious and secular groups, and because this diversity
of opinion may affect the relevant legal analysis.
Part II of this Article discusses the legal definitions of marriage
offered in the various states, suggesting that too much should not be
made of statutes which preclude same-sex marriage by definition rather
than merely prohibit such unions. Both definitional preclusions and
statutory prohibitions are subject to constitutional scrutiny, judges' and
Part III
commentators' views to the contrary notwithstanding. 4
discusses religious views concerning the permissibility of same-sex
marriage, pointing out both that there is no unanimous view on this
point and that, even if there was, the implications of such a consensus
would hardly be as telling as has been suggested. 5 Part IV discusses
whether the state is justified in enacting same-sex marriage bans to
protect the religious sensibilities of some, arguing that Free Exercise
guarantees preclude the state from maintaining a same-sex marriage ban
without a showing of probable harm, even if such a recognition would
offend some religious sensibilities. 6 The Article concludes by
suggesting that the fact that some religions recognize same-sex marriage
provides yet another ground upon which to establish that states cannot
7
meet their burden in justifying same-sex marriage bans.
II. THE LEGAL DEFINITIONS AND PURPOSES OF MARRIAGE
A civil union is a marriage-like status that accords the rights and
responsibilities of marriage to qualifying same-sex couples. An
analysis of that status can be offered only after certain related issues are
considered. First, do same-sex couples meet the legal definition of
4.
5.
6.
7.

See
See
See
See

infra Part
infra Part
infra Part
infra Part

11.
HI.
IV.
V.
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marriage and, if not, what implications does this have? Second, could
the legal functions and purposes of marriage be served even if both
parties are of the same sex and, if so, what implications does this have?
A. The Legal Definition of Marriage
Currently, no state permits same-sex couples to marry, although the
statutes establishing that prohibition vary significantly. Some statutes
define marriage as a union between a man and a woman, 8 others specify
that only a marriage between a man and a woman will be valid, 9 while
others specify that same-sex marriages are prohibited. 10 Consider the
Minnesota Statute that reads, "[miarriage, so far as its validity in law is
concerned, is a civil contract between a man and a woman.. ."I or the
Georgia Statute that reads, "[m]arriages between persons of the same
sex are prohibited in this state." 12 While both states refuse to permit
same-sex marriages to be celebrated locally, it is not at all clear that
either state claims that such unions are precluded by definition rather
than simply prohibited by law.
The Georgia and Minnesota statutes might be contrasted with the
Louisiana Statute, which reads, "[m]arriage is a legal relationship

8. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 86 (West 1999).
9. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572-1 (Michie 1999) ("In order to make valid the
marriage contract, which shall be only between a man and a woman .... ");IND. CODE § 31-11 1-1(a) (1999) ("Only a female may marry a male. Only a male may marry a female."); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 517.01 (West 1990 & Supp. 2001) ("Marriage, so far as its validity in law is
concerned, is a civil contract between a man and a woman .. ");WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
26.04.010 (West Supp. 2001) ("Marriage is a civil contract between a male and a female who
have each attained the age of eighteen years, and who are otherwise capable.").
10. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1(a) (1997).
11. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 517.01 (West 1990 & Supp. 2001).
12. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1(a); see also ALA. CODE § 30-1-19(b) (Lexis through 2001
legislation) ("A marriage contracted between individuals of the same sex is invalid in this state.");
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-101(c) (West 2000) ("Marriage between persons of the same sex is
void and prohibited."); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-109 (Michie 1998) ("A marriage between
persons of the same sex is void."); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572-1 ("A marriage between
persons of the same sex is void."); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.020(1) (Michie 1999) ("Marriage
is prohibited and void: ...[b]etween members of the same sex."); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19A,
§ 701(5) (West 1998) ("Persons of the same sex may not contract marriage."); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 551.1 (West. Supp. 2001) ("A marriage contracted between individuals of the same
sex is invalid in this state."); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 517.03(a) (West Supp. 2001) ("The following
marriages are prohibited: ... a marriage between persons of the same sex."); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 40-1-401(1) (1999) ("The following marriages are prohibited: ...a marriage between persons
of the same sex."); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-15 (Law. Co-op 2001) ("A marriage between persons
of the same sex is void ab initio and against the public policy of this State."); UTAH CODE ANN. §
30-1-2 (2001) ("The following marriages are prohibited and declared void:... between persons
of the same sex."); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.2 (Michie 2000) ("A marriage between persons of
the same sex is prohibited.").
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between a man and a woman that is created by civil contract." 13 Rather
than declare that certain individuals are prohibited from marrying or,
perhaps, that they will be unable to enter into a valid marital contract,
the Louisiana Statute provides a definition
of marriage which by its very
14
terms makes same-sex couples ineligible.
At least one question raised by these different ways of precluding
same-sex marriages is whether a legislature's enactment of one statute
rather than another would have different legal ramifications. 15 For
example, it might be thought that a definition rather than a mere
prohibition somehow represents the nature of things and thus is immune
from constitutional attack. The courts have indeed offered this natureof-things argument. Thus, when upholding the denial of a marriage
license to two women in Jones v. Hallahan,16 the Kentucky Court of
Appeals suggested that the "appellants [were] prevented from marrying,
not by the statutes of Kentucky or the refusal of the County Court Clerk
of Jefferson County to issue them a license, but rather by their own
incapability of entering into a marriage as that term is defined."' 7 Here,
the court implied that Kentucky could not have recognized a marriage
of same-sex partners even if the legislature had thought it appropriate to
do so, 18 because the "God of nature [had] made it otherwise."' 9 Had the
Kentucky court not believed the legislature was somehow precluded
from passing such a statute, the court would have admitted that the
statutes of Kentucky (rather than the individuals' sexes) prevented these

13. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 86.
14. Id. A separate question is how a state would treat a marriage involving a transsexual. For
example, the state may define the person's sex in terms of his or her anatomical and genetic
position at birth. See Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tex. App. 1999) ("At the time of
birth, Christie was a male, both anatomically and genetically."). If the person subsequently has a
sex-change operation, then two individuals apparently of the same sex might nonetheless marry.
See Transsexual, Woman Marry, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Sept. 18, 2000, at A4, available at 2000 WL
8066040 ("A transsexual who was born a man has exchanged marital vows with a woman in a
ceremony Saturday, taking advantage of a court ruling defining gender by chromosomes.").
15. There are certain ramifications if the legislature indicates that a particular union, although
prohibited, does not violate a strong public policy. See Mark Strasser, Judicial Good Faith and
the Baehr Essentials: On Giving Credit Where It's Due, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 313, 352-54 (1997)
(discussing the difference between a marriage merely prohibited and one which is void).
However, that is not important for current purposes.
16. Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973) (before 1976, the Court of Appeals was
Kentucky's highest court).
17. Id. at 589.
18. Id.
19. Scott v. State, 39 Ga. 321, 326 (1869). In Scott, the court explained that the state's
antimiscegenation statute was not unconstitutional because it merely regulated social status and
that moral and social equality did not and could not exist between the races because God had
made things otherwise. Id.
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individuals from marrying. Then the court would have engaged in the
relevant constitutional analysis to determine whether that exclusion was
20
permissible in light of state and federal constitutional guarantees.
Perhaps this sort of mistake was understandable in the 1970's,
because Baehr v. Lewin 2 1 had not yet been decided. In Baehr, a
plurality of the Hawaii Supreme Court suggested that the state's marital
statute prohibiting same-sex partners from marrying was subject to
constitutional scrutiny, and explicitly recognized that the definitional
argument advanced in Jones v. Hallahan was "circular and
unpersuasive." 22 Indeed, had Hawaii not changed its state constitution
by referendum in 1998,23 it seems likely that Hawaii would now
recognize same-sex marriages. 24 The same might be said of Alaska.25
Surprisingly, an analysis similar to the Kentucky Court of Appeals'
was offered in another jurisdiction in 1995, even after the Baehr
decision had been handed down. In his concurring and dissenting
opinion in Dean v. Districtof Columbia,26 Judge Terry suggested,
But if two people are incapable of being married because they are
members of the same sex and marriage requires two persons of
opposite sexes, . . . then I do not see how it makes any difference that

the District of Columbia, or any agency of its government,
discriminates against these two appellants by refusing to allow them to
enter into a legal status which the sameness
of their gender prevents
27
them from entering in the first place.
The Kentucky Supreme Court, Judge Terry, and various
commentators fail to appreciate that the plaintiffs would have been able

20. See Hallahan,501 S.W.2d at 589-90.
21. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), reconsiderationgranted in part, 875 P.2d 225
(Haw. 1993).
22. Id. at 61.
23. See Philip L. Bartlett II, Recent Legislation, Same-Sex Marriage,36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
581, 581 (1999) ("On November 3, 1998, Hawaii voters overwhelmingly passed a referendum
amending the state's constitution to give the legislature the power to reserve marriage to oppositesex couples.").
24. See Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public
Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1965 (1997) ("We can confidently predict that Hawaii
will recognize same-sex marriages ....).
25. See Johnson, supra note 2, at 27 ("I believe the Alaska Supreme Court would have
affirmed [a lower court decision requiring the state to permit same-sex couples to marry] if given
a chance, but the Alaska Legislature made sure the court was never given that chance.").
26. Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995).
27. Id. at 361 (Terry, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Dean v. District of
Columbia, No. 90-13892, 1992 WL 685364, at *3 (D.C. Super. Ct. June 2, 1992), aff'd, 653 A.2d
307 (D.C. 1995) ("[Ilit is the definition of marriage itself, not the 'sexual orientation' of the
plaintiffs herein, which stands as a bar to their obtaining a marriage license.").
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to marry, sameness of their sexes notwithstanding, had the respective
legislative bodies amended the relevant statutes. 28 The sameness of the

parties' sexes, like the ages of minors, or particular individuals'
relations of affinity or consanguinity, was only a bar to marriage
because the relevant statutes had made it a bar. A separate question
involves whether or not the particular limitations are justified, 29 but that
will not be answered by simply pointing out that a prohibitory definition
is included within the statute.
Some courts have understood that even if marriage was universally
recognized as being defined as the union of a man and a woman 30 it
would not preclude a legislature from changing the legal definition of
marriage and permitting same-sex couples to marry. In Littleton v.
Prange,31 a Texas appellate court noted, "Marriage is tightly defined in
32
the United States: 'a legal union between one man and one woman."'
Here, the court was not claiming that a state could not recognize samesex marriages. On the contrary, the court recognized that a state could
afford legal status to same-sex marriages, although it cautioned that
"even if one state were to recognize same-sex marriage, it would not
33
need to be recognized in any other state, and probably would not be."
While interstate recognition is a separate issue requiring its own
analysis, 34 the Littleton court at least implicitly understood that
definitions could not be used to immunize legislative decisions.

28. See, e.g., David Orgon Coolidge & William C. Duncan, Beyond Baker: The Case for a
Vermont MarriageAmendment, 25 VT. L. REV. 61, 87 (2000). "The institution of marriage, by
definition, is a sexual community that involves a man and a woman. Marriage is created by the
committed union of a male and a female, a union that is unique and potentially procreative. This
is a matter not only of history but of principle." Id.; see also infra notes 89-91 and accompanying
text (discussing other views of why marriage must be between different-sex couples).
29. See infra notes 161-69 and accompanying text (discussing the substantial threat test to
determine whether polygamy prohibitions pass constitutional muster).
30. Same-sex couples can now marry in Holland. See Dutch Legalize Marriagefor Same-Sex
Couples, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto, Can.), Dec. 20, 2000, at A15 ("The Dutch Senate approved a
law yesterday legalizing homosexual marriages and allowing same-sex couples to adopt children,
in the world's most comprehensive legal recognition of gay rights.") Those who offer the
definitional approach will presumably say that they do not recognize such unions as marriages
and thus no counter example has been offered to their definition, although even they would have
to admit that their definition is controversial.
31. Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App. 1999).
32. Id. at 226.
33. Id.
34. Arguably, states would be constitutionally required to recognize certain same-sex
marriages, e.g., those that were validly celebrated in a sister state domicile where the parties are
still domiciled. See generally Mark Strasser, For Whom Bell Tolls: On Subsequent Domiciles'
Refusing to Recognize Same-Sex Marriages,66 U. CIN. L. REV. 339-83 (1998) (discussing these
and related issues).
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B. The Nature and Purposes of Marriagefrom a Legal Perspective
Merely because marital statutes incorporating definitions are not
immune from constitutional scrutiny does not mean that they are
impermissible. Rather, they must be examined in light of the implicated
state and individual interests to see whether they pass constitutional
muster. Thus, the claim in this Article is not that all marital regulations
are arbitrary and should be rejected. As the Court recognized in
Zablocki v. Redhail,35 "reasonable regulations that do not significantly
interfere with decisions to enter into the marital relationship may
legitimately be imposed."' 36 Rather, this Article claims merely that each
marital regulation should be examined to determine whether "it is
state interests and is closely tailored
supported by sufficiently important
37
interests."
those
to effectuate only
Marriage involves such an important right that marital prohibitions
must be examined closely. As the United States Supreme Court has
recognized, the freedom to marry is "one of the vital personal rights
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." 38 Marriage is
"a coming together for better or for worse .... intimate to the degree of
being sacred."39 It occupies a "basic position ... in this society's
hierarchy of values," 40 and is an "association4 1for as noble a purpose as
any involved in [the Court's] prior decisions."
Marriage also serves a variety of societal and individual purposes.
Marriage provides a setting in which children might be produced and
raised and, given the gay baby boom, 4 2 this is an important reason to
recognize same-sex unions. Marriage also provides stability for adults,
making them both happier and more productive, 43 which is good both

35. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
36. Id. at 386.
37. Id. at 388.
38. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
39. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
40. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971).
41. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
42. Chuck Colbert, Editorial, Prophetic, Unsettling Times, NAT'L CATH. REP., Jan. 5, 2001, at
19, available at 2001 WL 8697127 (discussing "the Catholic lesbian and gay baby boom").
43. Betsy Hart Scripps, Both Sexes Thrive in Marriage, DESERET NEWS (Salt Lake City), Oct.
6, 2000, at A 17, available at 2000 WL 26968286.
So, an extensive survey of the data on marriage shows that married people, in
general, are significantly healthier, both physically and mentally, than their nonmarried peers: They are far more affluent, even when living on only one income;
women are safer, and men, even from backgrounds at "high-risk" for violence, are far
less likely to commit crime; they report more satisfying sex lives than their single
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for society and for the individuals involved. Thus, if recognizing samesex marriages would promote societal and individual interests, the state
must have important interests that would be undermined by recognizing
same-sex unions in order for such a refusal to be justified.
III. THE RELIGIOUS

VIEW OF MARRIAGE

Same-sex marriage opponents suggest that the state has important
interests which will be protected by reserving marriage for different-sex
couples. One interest that is playing an important role in these debates,
either implicitly or explicitly, is the claimed interest in upholding
religious values in general and in upholding the religious view of
marriage in particular.
When discussing the religious view of marriage, two different issues
must be addressed: (1) Is it true that marriage from a religious
perspective precludes same-sex unions, and (2) were that so, what
implications for the law would flow from that common religious
understanding of which marriages are forbidden? Views to the contrary
notwithstanding, (1) there is no universal religious view on the nature of
marriage even if one focuses solely on whether same-sex marriages are
permissible, and (2) even were this claimed consensus to exist, a4it
would not have the implications that are claimed by same-sex marriage
45
opponents.

peers, even those who are cohabiting; and overall they are significantly happier than
folks in any other kind of relationship "arrangement."
Id.
44. See Gidon Sapir, Religion and State-A Fresh Theoretical Start, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
579, 599-600 (1999) (arguing that religion presents a clear negative view of same-sex marriage).
45. See Steven A. Delchin, Comment, Scalia 18:22: Thou Shall Not Lie with the Academic
and Law School Elite; It Is an Abomination-Romer v. Evans and America 's Culture War, 47
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 207, 243 (1996) (stating that "other divisive policy issues-most notably,
the ban on same-sex marriages-are grounded primarily on traditional religious morality"); cf.
Stephen L. Carter, "Defending" Marriage:A Modest Proposal,41 HOW. L.J. 215, 226 (1998).
I would say that what's really important for defenders of traditional marriage (and
here when I say traditional, I am excluding same-sex marriage) is to be crystal-clear
about why marriage is worth defending. Why do I say that? Because of the alarming
casualness I have mentioned. That is to say, one has to have a plan for overcoming the
casualness which is the greatest threat to marriage. I believe that abandoning state
control of marriage and turning it over to religions and other private institutions could
be a step toward recovering this solemn and sacred nature of marriage.
Id. Professor Carter seems not to have considered that allowing religions to control marriage
might mean that same-sex marriages would thereby be recognized.
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A. The Lack of Religious Unanimity Regarding Same-Sex Marriage
The claim that no religion (or country, for that matter) 46 recognizes
same-sex unions simply is not tenable. Some, rather than all, religions
refuse to recognize same-sex unions. 47
Quakers, Unitarians,
Buddhists, 48 Reconstructionist Jews, 4 9 and Reform Jews 5° might all
celebrate same-sex unions. Thus, when commentators suggest that the
same-sex marriage debate is between those who would respect religious
views and those who would not, they offer an inaccurate picture of the
debate. 5 1 Thus, it cannot be claimed that a state's refusal to recognize
same-sex marriage somehow supports the religious sanctity of marriage
as a general matter or even that a state considering the recognition of
such unions is clearly a slap in the face of anyone religious. 52 Rather,
the most that opponents can claim is that the state position supports the
religious dictates of some, but not all, religions.
The United States Constitution requires state neutrality with respect
to the religions, 53 and between religion and non-religion. 54 Yet, a state
46. See Stefanie Batcho, Two Gay Couples Marry in Canada Using Legal Loophole, AGENCE
FRANCE-PRESSE, Jan. 15, 2001, available at 2001 WL 2321002 (stating that the Netherlands now
recognizes same-sex marriages).
47. See Bryan H. Wildenthal, To Say "I Do": Shahar v. Bowers, Same-Sex Marriage,and
Public Employee Free Speech Rights, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 381, 426 (1998) ("[T]here is no
religious consensus on any one model of marriage.").
48. See MARK STRASSER, LEGALLY WED: SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE CONSTITUTION 12
(1997) (suggesting that these groups recognize same-sex marriages).
49. Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1100 (11 th Cir. 1997) (en banc) ("Plaintiff Robin Joy
Shahar is a woman who has 'married' another woman in a ceremony performed by a rabbi within
the Reconstructionist Movement of Judaism.").
50. Patricia Rice, Religion: New Jewish Elementary School Fills Growing Need, ST. Louis
POST-DISPATCH, May 13, 2000, at 25, available at 2000 WL 3525447. "While seeking renewal,
many Reform Jews continue to pride themselves on a theology that allows rabbis to adjust
biblical directives. For example, this year the national Reform leadership agreed to bless samesex marriages." Id.
51. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text (discussing views that offer this
understanding of the debate).
52. See generally James M. Donovan, DOMA: An Unconstitutional Establishment Of
FundamentalistChristianity,4 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 335, 350 (1997) (discussing the views of
members of Congress that same-sex marriage offends religious views).
53. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984) (suggesting that the Constitution
"affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids
hostility toward any").
54. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 605 (1989) (noting that the Court has
held the Establishment Clause "to mean no official preference even for religion over
nonreligion") (citing Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989)); see also Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52-53 (1985) ("[T]he Court has unambiguously concluded that the
individual freedom of conscience protected by the First Amendment embraces the right to select
any religious faith or none at all.").

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 33

would hardly be neutral if it refused to recognize same-sex marriage
because that recognition would not be compatible with the views of
some religions. The Court has made quite clear that the "Free Exercise
Clause simply cannot be understood to require the Government to
conduct its own internal affairs in ways that comport with the religious
beliefs of particular citizens." 55 Even if the religious sentiments of
some would be offended by recognizing civil unions or same-sex
marriages, that alone would not suffice to justify the state's refusal to
recognize such unions. 56 Indeed, a citizen could not successfully
challenge the granting of benefits (and using taxes to pay for those
benefits) by claiming that one's religion would not support that use of
taxes. As the Supreme Court has explained, "[t]he tax system could not
function if denominations were allowed to challenge the tax system
because tax payments were spent in a manner that violates their
57
religious belief.Courts have had some difficulty in figuring out the implications of
the religious neutrality requirement in the context under discussion here.
For example, in Dean v. District of Columbia,5 8 the trial court suggested
that the Establishment Clause was not violated merely because a law
59
"happen[ed] to coincide with the tenets of some or all religions."
Such a statement is unobjectionable-murder, for example, is both
religiously and legally proscribed. 60 However, the court made clear that
it was far more deferential to particular religious views than such an
observation might imply, suggesting that the Establishment Clause is
not violated by a same-sex marriage ban because "[n]o 'religion' is
advanced by a refusal to ... [recognize such unions], since said refusal

55.
56.

Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699 (1986).
See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 452 (1988).
A broad range of government activities-from social welfare programs to foreign aid
to conservation projects-will always be considered essential to the spiritual wellbeing of some citizens, often on the basis of sincerely held religious beliefs. Others
will find the very same activities deeply offensive, and perhaps incompatible with their
own search for spiritual fulfillment and with the tenets of their religion. The First
Amendment must apply to all citizens alike, and it can give to none of them a veto over
public programs that do not prohibit the free exercise of religion. The Constitution
does not, and courts cannot, offer to reconcile the various competing demands on
government, many of them rooted in sincere religious belief, that inevitably arise in so
diverse a society as ours.

Id.
57.
58.
1992),
59.
60.

United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260 (1982).
Dean v. District of Columbia, No. 90-13892, 1992 WL 685364 (D.C. Super. Ct. June 2,
aff'd, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995).
lid. at *5.
Id. at *6.
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applies equally to same-sex applicants who are atheists, agnostics or
believers, and no one is thereby coerced in the slightest to alter his or
her convictions." 6 1 Such a standard allows far too much. For example,
it would permit public schools to have students elected to offer nondenominational prayers at football games, since all students at the
school, whether atheists, agnostics or believers, might potentially be
selected to give the address, and all attending the game, whether
atheists, agnostics or believers, would get to hear such prayers, and no
one would be coerced into altering his or her convictions. Yet, the
Court has made clear that such a practice violates the Establishment
62
Clause.
The Dean trial court was willing to uphold legislative action which
was "merely being motivated by religious convictions." 63 The court
was perfectly comfortable with the notion that the District of Columbia
marriage ban might have been motivated by the belief that same-sex
marriage was "morally repugnant (even if this belief were of religious
origin)." 64 After all, as the court suggested, when one engages in the
correct due process inquiry, one sees that the relevant issue is "not the
fundamental nature of an abstract 'right to marry,' but rather, whether
the Constitution confers a fundamental right upon persons of the same
sex to marry one another." 65 Because of this "correct" framing of the
interest in promoting
question, the court held that the legitimate
66
religious morality sufficed to justify the ban.
Ironically, the Dean trial court cited Loving v. Virginia to support its
position. 67 Yet, if the Loving Court had examined "not the fundamental
nature of an abstract 'right to marry' but, rather, whether the
Constitution confers a fundamental right upon persons" of different
races to marry and had, in addition, consulted the history and traditions
of this country to provide an answer, 68 the Court would never have
suggested that Virginia's anti-miscegenation statute violated due

61. Id. at *7.
62. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 301 (2000) (striking down such a
practice as a violation of the Establishment Clause).
63. Dean, 1992 WL 685364, at *5.
64. Id. at *6.
65. Id. at *1.
66. See infra notes 103-10 and accompanying text (discussing why this might not suffice as a
justification even when no fundamental rights or religious practices are at issue).
67. Dean, 1992 WL 685364, at *3 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967)).
68. See id. at * 1.
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process guarantees. 69 If a belief that the relationship was "morally
repugnant (even if this belief were of religious origin) ' 70 was all that
was necessary to justify Virginia's anti-miscegenation statute, 7 1 as long
as the recognition of the particular union at issue was not "deeply rooted
in this Nation's history and tradition," 72 then the Court would have
issued a much different opinion. After all, many in Virginia at the time
thought interracial marriages were morally repugnant. 73 Further,
several states prohibited interracial marriage the year that Loving was
decided,7 4 and thus it would have been easy to establish that the
recognition of such unions was not firmly rooted in the Nation's history
and traditions.
Certainly, the Loving Court did not need to discuss federal due
process guarantees in order to strike down Virginia's antimiscegenation statute because the statute explicitly classified on the
basis of race. 75 The Loving Court pointed out both that "[t]here can be
no question but that Virginia's miscegenation statutes rest solely upon
distinctions drawn according to race," 76 and that there was "no
legitimate overriding purpose independent of invidious racial
discrimination which justifie[d] th[e] classification. 7 7 Yet, as the
supreme courts of Hawaii and Vermont have indicated, same-sex

69. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 ("These statutes also deprive the Lovings of liberty without due
process of law in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
70. See Dean, 1992 WL 685364, at *6.
71. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 3. In Loving the Court discussed the trial court's suggestion that:
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he placed
them on separate continents. And but for the interference with his arrangement there
would be no cause for such marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows that
he did not intend for the races to mix.
Id.
72. See Dean, 1992 WL 685364, at *1-2 (citing Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S.
494, 503 (1977)).
73. See Mary Becker, Women, Morality, and Sexual Orientation,8 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 165,
("antimiscegenation statutes banned conduct traditionally seen as
169 (1998)
immoral-interracial marriage in southern states-yet in Loving v. Virginia, the Court
nevertheless held such a statute unconstitutional").
74. Loving, 388 U.S. at 6 & n.5 (listing the states outlawing interracial marriage: Alabama,
Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia).
75. See id. at 4 (quoting the language of the statute: "[I]f any white person intermarry with a
colored person, or any colored person intermarry with a white person, he shall be punished by
confinement in the penitentiary.").
76. ld. at 11.
77. Id.
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marriage bans expressly distinguish on the basis of gender, 78 and it
marriage ban would survive heightened
seems unlikely that a same-sex
79
constitutional scrutiny.
Arguably, same-sex marriage bans, like bans on interracial marriage,
are precluded by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. 80 However, the claim here is not based on Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees. Further, the analysis in this Article is to be
distinguished from other lines of argument that have been offered in the
literature regarding the relationship between religious beliefs on the one
hand and the imposition of legal disabilities on lesbians, gays, bisexuals
and transgendered people on the other.
Some commentators and judges suggest that adverse treatment on the
basis of sexual orientation is a product of religious bias, 8 1 and that laws
passed because of a religious view about the alleged immorality of
same-sex relations do not pass constitutional muster 82 unless the state
has an independent and legitimate reason to have the regulation. 83 In

78. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 64 (Haw. 1993), reconsiderationgranted in part, 875
P.2d 225 (Haw. 1993) (stating that "HRS § 572-1 establishes a sex-based classification"); Baker
v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 880 (Vt. 1999) ("[T]he marriage statutes apply expressly to opposite-sex
couples. Thus, the statutes exclude anyone who wishes to marry someone of the same sex."); see
also Mark Strasser, Equal Protection at the Crossroads:On Baker, Common Benefits, and Facial
Neutrality, 42 ARIZ. L. RE V. 935 (2000) (discussing how the Vermont Supreme Court
misunderstood the test to determine when sex-based classifications trigger heightened scrutiny).
79. In Baker, Vermont's refusal to accord same-sex couples the rights and benefits of
marriage did not survive a test that was even weaker than heightened scrutiny. See Baker, 744
A.2d at 885 (suggesting that the state did not have a "reasonable and just basis" for excluding
same-sex couples from the benefits and protections that flow from marriage); see also infra notes
170-75 and accompanying text (suggesting that a same-sex marriage ban would not survive
heightened or strict scrutiny).
80. See generally Mark Strasser, Domestic Relations Jurisprudence and the Great,
Slumbering Baehr: On Definitional Preclusion, Equal Protection, and Fundamental Interests, 64
FORDHAM L. REV. 921 (1995).
81. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 211-12 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
("A State can no more punish private behavior because of religious intolerance than it can punish
such behavior because of racial animus."); cf. DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, WOMEN, GAYS AND THE
CONSTITUTION 397 (1998) ("[T]he justification of Colorado Amendment Two in these terms
reveals quite clearly why the amendment reflects constitutionally invidious religious
intolerance."). Colorado's Amendment Two precluded localities from offering protection against
sexual orientation discrimination. Id. At the time, Denver, Aspen and Boulder had statutes
precluding discrimination on the basis of a variety of classifications including sexual orientation.
Id.
82. See, e.g., Bowers, 478 U.S. at 211 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("That certain, but by no
means all, religious groups condemn the behavior at issue gives the State no license to impose
their judgments on the entire citizenry.").
83. See, e.g., id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The legitimacy of secular legislation depends
instead on whether the State can advance some justification for the law beyond its conformity to
religious doctrine."). If there is a legitimate reason, then the statute need not be invalidated even
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this Article, the claim is not that all religions are biased, especially
considering that there is no uniform religious view regarding the
permissibility of same-sex relations, but is merely that the willingness
of some religious 84groups to recognize same-sex marriage has
constitutional import.
Commentators also suggest that a proper understanding of the
freedom of conscience includes a freedom from moral slavery 85 that
would protect the right to same-sex marriage. 86 In this Article, the
claim does not involve the more robust notion of liberty of conscience
that is implied in those discussions, 87 but the weaker notion of freedom
of conscience that merely includes existing religious beliefs and
practices.
B. The Legal Implications of Religious Consensus About Marriage
It might be thought that all religions preclude same-sex couples from
marrying 88 and merely disagree about the justification for prohibiting
same-sex marriage. One religion might say that same-sex individuals
89
cannot marry because they cannot produce a child through their union;
another might say that such individuals cannot form a union which
would reflect "the icon of man and woman destined from the first book
of revelation as partners in procreation, mutual commitment, and an

if in fact it was motivated by religious views. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 445
(1961) ("To say that the States cannot prescribe Sunday as a day of rest for these purposes solely
because centuries ago such laws had their genesis in religion would give a constitutional
interpretation of hostility to the public welfare rather than one of mere separation of church and
State.").
84. See infra notes 117-20 and accompanying text (describing why religious recognition of
same-sex unions has constitutional import).
85. See, e.g., David A. J. Richards, ContractualistImpartiality in the American Struggle for
Justice: A Comment on ProfessorAllen's "Social Contract Theory in American Case Law," 51
FLA. L. REV. 41, 63 (1999) (suggesting that moral slavery involves an abridgment of basic human
rights which "is rationalized on inadequate grounds (the naturalization of injustice in terms of an
unjust cultural stereotype of race, or gender, or gendered sexuality).").
86. David Richards provides an extensive development of this view. See generally
RICHARDS, supra note 81. Richards has been described as offering "the most sustained and
thoughtful exposition of this position." Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical
Understandingof Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1409, 1492 (1990).
87. The point here is not to challenge Richards's view, but merely to suggest that the
argument here involves something else.
88. See generally Rev. Raymond C. O'Brien, Single-Gender Marriage: A Religious
Perspective, 7 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REv. 429 (1998) (suggesting that the religious
perspective clearly precludes same-sex marriages).
89. See John Finnis, Law, Morality and "Sexual Orientation," 69 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1049,
1066 (1994) (discussing philosophical and common sense arguments regarding reproduction).
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ordered pair for procreation and rearing of children;" 90 still another
might suggest that such unions are precluded because of the required
complementarity of the partners; 9 1 and still others might offer additional
reasons. 92 However, all of these religions would be presenting a united
front with respect to the view that such unions should be prohibited, and
the debate surrounding same-sex unions
would be characterized as
93
pitting religion against the secular state.
Even if this unanimity existed among the religions, it is not at all
clear what implications would follow. Presumably, those claiming this
consensus 94 would not be arguing, for example, that any marriage
recognized by a religion should be recognized by the state, because they
would then be suggesting that polygamous unions should be
recognized. 95 Nor would they be suggesting that any unions not
recognized by any religion should not be recognized by the state. Were
it true that no religion would recognize the marital unions of atheists,

90. O'Brien, supra note 88, at 445 (describing the religious perspective offered by the Roman
Catholic Church).
91. See Richard F. Duncan, From Loving to Romer: Homosexual Marriage and Moral
Discernment, 12 BYU J. PUB. L. 239, 251 (1998). "The dual-gender marriage requirement...
recognizes and celebrates the physical differences between men and women and their obvious
sexual complementarity ... [and] the equal indispensability of both genders to the institution of
marriage." Id.
92. Of course one religion might offer several of these reasons.
93. Cf. O'Brien, supra note 88, at 458 (offering other examples in which, allegedly, secular
society is hostile to the "religious perspective").
94. Cf. Duncan, supra note 91, at 241 (discussing an alleged "unanimous, international
consensus on the meaning of marriage" among different states and countries).
95. See David L. Chambers, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage,26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 53, 61
(1997) ("Most Americans do not know that polygamy, and particularly polygyny, the practice of
men marrying more than one woman, remains widespread in the world as a whole. Well more
than half of nonindustrialized societies permit polygyny still today."); Elizabeth Harmer-Dionne,
Note, Once a Peculiar People: Cognitive Dissonanceand the Suppression of Mormon Polygamy
as a Case Study Negating the Belief-Action Distinction, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1295, 1298 (1998)
("The question of polygamy is not merely a historical one. Both African Christians and Moslems
may currently engage in the practice."); Keith Jaasma, Note, The Religious Freedom Restoration
Act: Responding to Smith, Reconsidering Reynolds, 16 WHITIER L. REV. 211, 246-47 (1995)
("It has been estimated that there are some 50,000 practicing Mormon polygamists in the United
States, living mostly in California, Arizona, Utah, and Idaho.").
Commentators suggest that if same-sex marriage is recognized then polygamy will be too. See,
e.g., Harry D. Krause, Marriagefor the New Millennium: Heterosexual, Same Sex-Or Not at
All? 34 FAM. L.Q. 271, 288 (2000) ("If same sex marriage were allowed, would (constitutional)
equal protection and privacy rationale soon compel the recognition of polygamous marriages?
Hyperbole? Probably not."); infra notes 142-69 and accompanying text (discussing polygamy).
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presumably a state would use this as a reason to refuse to recognize
96
such unions.
The point here, of course, is not to suggest that religions in fact agree
on the permissibility of same-sex marriages, because that would be
false. 97 Rather, the point is merely that even were all of the religions to
agree that same-sex marriages should not be recognized, that alone
would not justify the state's refusal to do so.
C. The Legal Implications of a Religious Moral Consensus
The Dean trial court upheld the same-sex marriage ban at issue,
believing it irrelevant that the prohibition might have been based upon
the legislators' religious and moral beliefs. 98 Richard Myers claims that
the "argument against recognizing same-sex 'marriages' goes well
beyond a simple citation to Biblical sources," suggesting that there are
"well-developed moral theories that reject treating such unions as
marriages that are more than sufficient to remove any Establishment
Clause arguments." 99 However, Myers fails to appreciate that these
"theories" support rather than undermine the legal recognition of samesex marriage when (1) they have been pruned of some of their internally
inconsistent facets, and, (2) they take into account the relationship
between morality and law in other areas of domestic relations law. 100
Even were Myers to recognize that these theories support the legal
recognition of same-sex unions, he would presumably nonetheless claim
that same-sex marriage bans are constitutionally permissible, not
because of these "independent" moral theories, but because he believes
that religious moral arguments suffice for constitutional purposes to
establish that such unions should not be recognized.' 0 ' It is simply

96. Cf. Amy Gutmann, Religious Freedom and Civic Responsibility, 56 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 907, 918 (1999) ("So as not to coerce any citizens into a religious marriage, governmental
officials also should be able to marry couples solely in the eyes of the law.").
97. See supra notes 44, 48-50 and accompanying text (describing religions that recognize
same-sex unions).
98. Dean v. Dist. of Columbia, No. 90-13892, 1992 WL 685364, at *8 (D.C. June 2, 1992),
affd, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
99. Richard S.Myers, Same-Sex "Marriage"and the Public Policy Doctrine, 32 CREIGHTON
L. REV. 45, 65 (1998).
100. See Mark Strasser, MaritalActs, Morality and the Right to Privacy, 30 N.M. L. REV. 43
(2000); Mark Strasser, Natural Law and Same-Sex Marriage, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 51 (1998).
These articles address the views of Professors Bradley, Lee, George, and Finnis, although the
points would also apply to the moral analysis offered by Professor David Orgon Coolidge. David
Orgon Coolidge, Same-Sex Marriage?:Baehr v. Miike and the Meaning of Marriage,38 S.TEX.
L. REV. 1 (1997).
101. See Myers, supra note 99, at 63-64.
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unclear whether religious moral views, especially the moral views of
some rather than all religions, will, without more, suffice to justify
legislation as a general matter, much less justify the legislation at issue
102
here.
In Bowers v. Hardwick,10 3 the Court implied that the presumed °4
religious moral views 10 5 of the Georgia populace sufficed to provide a
rational basis for the state's statute criminalizing sodomy. 1°6 However,
in Romer v. Evans,10 7 that same Court presumed' 0 8 "rational"
disapproval of sodomy did not suffice to justify the imposition of civil
penalties against lesbians, gays, and bisexuals, prompting some
commentators to suggest that Romer effectively overruled Bowers. 109
Justice Scalia argued in his Romer dissent that "[ilf it is constitutionally
permissible for a State to make homosexual conduct criminal, surely it
is constitutionally permissible for a State to enact other laws merely
disfavoring homosexual conduct."l 0 While Scalia's argument did not
win the day in Romer, a separate question is whether his analysis and
implicit ordering are correct. If (1) Romer merely involved laws
disfavoring same-sex conduct, (2) such laws are more constitutionally
palatable than laws making same-sex conduct criminal, and (3) laws
disfavoring same-sex conduct are nonetheless unconstitutional, then
Romer would seem to significantly undermine the Bowers holding.
Thus, the question at hand is whether the contrapositive of Justice
Scalia's position is true-because states are constitutionally prohibited
from enacting laws "merely disfavoring" same-sex relations, the states
are also prohibited from making adult same-sex consensual conduct

102. A separate question is whether even if sufficing as a general matter, it should suffice
when the interest in something as fundamental as the right to marry is at issue. See supra notes
78-80 and accompanying text (suggesting that Fourteenth Amendment guarantees are implicated
by same-sex marriage bans); infra notes 165-75 and accompanying text (suggesting that First
Amendment guarantees are implicated by such bans).
103. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
104. See id. at 196 (discussing the "presumed belief of a majority of the electorate in
Georgia that homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable").
105. See id. (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("Condemnation of those practices is firmly rooted in
Judeao-Christian moral and ethical standards.").
106. See id. at 188-89.
107. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
108. "Presumed" rather than "actual" seems especially appropriate to emphasize here, since
Colorado had been one of the first states to repeal its sodomy law. See id. at 645 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
109. See RICHARDS, supra note 81, at 414-415; Thomas C. Grey, Bowers v. Hardwick
Diminished, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 373, 374 (1997) ("To the extent its logic holds, Romer is
inconsistent with Hardwick and implicitly overrules it.").
110. Romer, 517 U.S. at 641 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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criminal. If Justice Scalia's analysis is correct, then Bowers has been
effectively overruled.
The analysis offered in this Article is not dependent upon whether or
not Bowers has been implicitly overruled. Even if sodomy may be or in
fact has been criminalized in a particular state, this would not prevent
that state from recognizing same-sex unions. Most states that have
sodomy statutes do not distinguish between same-sex and different-sex
sodomy' l l and, further, do not distinguish between marital and nonmarital sodomy. 1 12 Nonetheless, the statutes have been read as
including an implicit marital exception. 113 Indeed, some courts have
11. See Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Sweeping Reform from Small Rules? Anti-Bias Canons as
a Substitutefor Heightened Scrutiny, 85 MINN. L. REV. 363, 390 n. 114 (2000) (explaining that in
thirteen states the sodomy statutes do not distinguish between same-sex and different-sex
relations, whereas in five states only same-sex sodomitical relations are prohibited).
112. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65(a) (1994) ("A person commits the crime of sexual
misconduct if: ... He or she engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another person under
circumstances other than those covered by [sections dealing with forcible sodomy or sodomy
with a minor]."); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1411 (West 2001), repealed by 2001 Ariz. Legis.
Serv. 382 (West) ("A person who knowingly and without force commits the infamous crime
against nature with an adult is guilty of a class 3 misdemeanor."); IDAHO CODE § 18-6605
(Michie 1997) ("Every person who is guilty of the infamous crime against nature, committed with
mankind or with any animal, is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not less than five
years."); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:89 (West 1986) ("Crime against nature is: ... The unnatural
carnal copulation by a human being with another of the same sex or opposite sex or with an
animal, except that anal sexual intercourse between two human beings shall not be deemed as a
crime against nature when done under any of the circumstances described in [certain rape
statutes]."); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272 § 34 (West 1992) ("Whoever commits the
abominable and detestable crime against nature, either with mankind or with a beast, shall be
punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than twenty years."); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 750.158 (West 1991) ("Any person who shall commit the abominable and
detestable crime against nature either with mankind or with any animal shall be guilty of a felony,
punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not more than 15 years .... ); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 609.293(5) (West 1987), recognized as unconstitutionalby In re Proposed Petition to Recall
Hatch, 628 N.W.2d 125 (2001) ("Whoever... voluntarily engages in or submits to an act of
sodomy with another may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than one year or to
payment of a fine of not more than $3,000, or both."); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-59 (2000)
("Every person who shall be convicted of the detestable and abominable crime against nature
committed with mankind or with a beast, shall be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary
for a term of not more than ten years."); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-177 (1999) ("If any person shall
commit the crime against nature, with mankind or beast, he shall be punished as a Class I
felon."); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-403(1) (1999) ("A person commits sodomy when the actor
engages in any sexual act with a person who is 14 years of age or older involving the genitals of
one person and mouth or anus of another person, regardless of the sex of either participant."); VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-361(A) (Michie 1996) ("If any person carnally knows in any manner any
brute animal, or carnally knows any male or female person by the anus or by or with the mouth,
or voluntarily submits to such carnal knowledge, he or she shall be guilty of a Class 6
felony ....
").
113. See Mark Strasser, Sex, Law, and the Sacred Precincts of the Marital Bedroom: On State
and Federal Right to Privacy Jurisprudence, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 753,
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read Griswold v. Connecticut 1 4 to require such an exception. 1 5 Were
same-sex unions recognized, the sodomy statutes would presumably be
1 16
read to incorporate an implicit exception for those same-sex couples.
Otherwise, the whole line of privacy cases following Griswold would
seem to be in jeopardy.
Suppose that there were a religious consensus about the
impermissibility of sodomy.
That would hardly establish that
individuals who commit sodomy should not be allowed to marry or that
they should not be allowed to remain married. The protection of marital
sodomy notwithstanding, the condemnation of such practices by at least
some religions suggests that the use of the sodomy argument is a
specious attempt to justify the existence of same-sex marriage bans.
IV.

STATE REGULATION OF RELIGIOUS CONDUCT

That some religions sanctify same-sex unions establishes that there is
no religious unanimity with respect to whether such unions should be
celebrated. Yet, there is another aspect of this willingness to recognize
such unions that has not been given adequate attention, namely, that the
religious significance of marriage has constitutional import and that this
is a reason that same-sex marriages should be legally recognized.
A. The ConstitutionalImplications of the Religious Import of Marriage
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the religious
significance of marriage."l 7 Indeed, the Court explained why the

760 (2000) ("[E]ven those states that have sodomy laws have created exceptions for married
couples either though their legislatures or their courts.").
114. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
115. See Cotner v. Henry, 394 F.2d 873, 875-76 (7th Cir. 1968).
Under Griswold Indiana courts could not interpret the statute constitutionally as
making private consensual physical relations between married persons a crime absent a
clear showing that the state had an interest in preventing such relations, which
outweighed the constitutional right to marital privacy. The Indiana courts might,
however, construe the statute as being inapplicable to married couples or as outlawing
such physical relations between married couples only when accomplished by force.
Under the latter interpretation, the protection of the Griswold rule would not be
available to Cotner if there was a showing that Cotner employed force.
Id.; State v. Elliot, 551 P.2d 1352, 1352 (N.M. 1976) (suggesting that Griswold protects
consensual marital but not consensual non-marital sodomy); People v. Mehr, 383 N.Y.S.2d 798,
799 (1976) (finding Griswold protects consensual marital sodomy); State v. Santos, 413 A.2d 58,
68 (R.I. 1980) ("[Tlhe right of privacy is inapplicable to the private unnatural copulation between
unmarried adults.").
116. See Strasser, supra note 113, at 761.
117. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 663 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (discussing
the "religious or quasi-religious connotations that marriage has").
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interest in marriage is fundamental in Turner v. Safley. 118 The Court
noted that "many religions recognize marriage as having spiritual
significance; for some... therefore, the commitment of marriage may
be an exercise of religious faith as well as an expression of personal
dedication."119
The Turner Court did not suggest that marriage would have religious
significance only if a duty to marry had been imposed by that religion,
and Turner makes clear that the state would be remiss for imposing
unnecessary burdens on marriage even without an explicit religious duty
to tie a marital knot. 120 One would not have understood this aspect of
Supreme Court right-to-marry jurisprudence from reading the Eleventh
Circuit decision of Shahar v. Bowers 12 1 In Shahar,the court upheld the
State Attorney General's rescinding a job offer to Robin Shahar because
she had married her same-sex partner in a religious ceremony. 122 The
court downplayed the importance of Shahar's having married her
partner in such a ceremony 23 because her religion did not impose a duty
upon her to marry. 124 One can imagine the reactions were a court to try
to justify a job offer rescission by pointing out that (1) a member of a
different-sex couple had married someone of whom the public did not

118. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
119. Id. at 96.
120. The Turner Court struck down the prison's limitation on the prisoners' right to marry.
See id. at 81 (concluding that "the marriage restriction cannot be sustained"). The Court did so
notwithstanding the traditional deference to the prison authorities' decisions on prison matters.
See id. (acknowledging the "lesser standard of scrutiny [which] is appropriate in determining the
validity of prison rules").
121. Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097 (1lth Cir. 1997).
122. Id. at 1099.
123. See id. at 1118 (Tjoflat, J., specially concurring).
The record establishes that homosexual "marriages" are recognized by a part of the
Reconstructionist movement of the Jewish faith. In addition, the record shows that
Shahar and her partner are life-long Jews and that they have been active in a Jewish
congregation which ministers to homosexuals and recognizes homosexual "marriages."
Shahar's wedding ceremony was performed by a rabbi and was otherwise quite similar
to a traditional Jewish wedding between a man and a woman. These facts establish
that Shahar's wedding ceremony was an exercise of her religion: she participated in a
"wedding" ceremony that was in accord with her sincere religious beliefs.
Id. (Tjoflat, J., specially concurring).
124. See id. at 1099. "Given especially that Plaintiff's religion requires a woman neither to
'marry' another female-even in the case of lesbian couples-nor to marry at all, considerable
doubt also exists that she has a constitutionally protected federal right to be 'married' to another
woman to engage in her religion." Id.
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approve, 125 and (2) the person's religion (Reconstructionist Judaism,
26
Catholicism or whatever) did not impose a duty on her to marry.1
The point in this Article should not be misunderstood. The claim is
not that Shahar was being penalized because127 she was engaging in a
practice promoted by her religion. 128 The same result presumably
would have occurred were Shahar and her partner to have taken part in a
ceremony that was not religiously endorsed. Further, the claim is not
that the result would have been different had there been a religiously
imposed duty to marry. Even were there such a duty, this would not

125. See id. at 1108. "Shahar argues that he may not justify his decision by reference to
perceived public hostility to her 'marriage.' We have held otherwise about the significance of
public perception when law enforcement is involved." Id.
126. A separate question involves how central a religious practice is. However, the Court has
suggested that it is unwilling to be the arbiter of that issue. See Employment Div., Dep't of
Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886-87 (1990).
It is no more appropriate for judges to determine the "centrality" of religious beliefs
before applying a "compelling interest" test in the free exercise field, than it would be
for them to determine the "importance" of ideas before applying the "compelling
interest" test in the free speech field. What principle of law or logic can be brought to
bear to contradict a believer's assertion that a particular act is "central" to his personal
faith?
Id.; Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 457-58 (1988).
Seeing the Court as the arbiter, the dissent proposes a legal test under which it would
decide which public lands are "central" or "indispensable" to which religions, and by
implication which are "dispensable" or "peripheral," and would then decide which
government programs are "compelling" enough to justify "infringement of those
practices." We would accordingly be required to weigh the value of every religious
belief and practice that is said to be threatened by any government program. Unless a
"showing of 'centrality,"' is nothing but an assertion of centrality, the dissent thus
offers us the prospect of this Court's holding that some sincerely held religious beliefs
and practices are not "central" to certain religions, despite protestations to the contrary
from the religious objectors who brought the lawsuit. In other words, the dissent's
approach would require us to rule that some religious adherents misunderstand their
own religious beliefs. We think such an approach cannot be squared with the
Constitution or with our precedents, and that it would cast the Judiciary in a role that
we were never intended to play.
Id. (citations omitted).
127. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1118 (Tjoflat, J., specially concurring) ("[T]here is no evidence
that the religious nature of the ceremony motivated the Attorney General's decision.").
128. See id. at 1120 (Godbold, J., dissenting).
But the critical facts are that Shahar and her partner are lifelong adherents to Judaism
and good-faith, dedicated participants in the Reconstructionist Movement; the
Reconstructionist Movement is a significant movement within American Judaism; and
it regards same-sex marriages as acceptable and desirable in preference to couples
living together without marriage.
Id. (Godbold, J., dissenting).
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have guaranteed that the right to marry would be respected. 129 Rather,
the point is that the decision was rife with rationalizations which would
have been rejected out of hand had they been offered in most other
contexts.
Supposedly, had Shahar taken the job, there would have been a lack
of "public confidence" in her ability to perform that job. 30 Yet, as
Judge Birch pointed out in dissent, the same "reasonable concerns"
would presumably have disqualified an unmarried person who was
dating from working for the State Attorney General, since that person
might have been presumed to be unable to enforce Georgia's fornication
law.131 Indeed, there is reason to doubt the State Attorney General's
sincerity concerning public confidence in law enforcement, given his
1 32
admission of a long adulterous affair in violation of Georgia law.
Further, as if to add insult to injury, the Georgia Supreme Court
declared Georgia's sodomy law unconstitutional a year after the

129. Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146, 1155 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
("Thus the prohibition of plural marriage has been upheld, even though the practice is a religious
duty to some."); see also Potter v. Murray City, 585 F. Supp. 1126, 1134 (D. Utah 1984).
The landmark decision in the area of freedom of religion in connection with polygamy
is Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879) ... in which the Supreme Court
confirmed a conviction even though the defendant believed that the practice of
polygamy was his religious duty and of divine origin and he had received permission
from the authorities of his church to enter into the polygamist marriages.
Id.
130. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1110; see also Cynthia J. Frost, Shahar v. Bowers: That Girl
Just Didn't Have Good Sense!, 17 LAW & INEQ. J. 57, 76-77 (1999) ("The court also determined
that the Attorney General was not unreasonable to believe that Shahar's presence on his staff
could damage the Department's credibility with the public.").
131. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1128 (Birch, J., dissenting).
Compounding this deficiency in Bowers' assertion that his prediction is "reasonable" is
the fact that Bowers does not make the same assumption with respect to any of his
other employees: He does not assume, for instance, that an unmarried employee who is
openly dating an individual of the opposite sex has likely committed fornication, a
criminal offense in Georgia, and thus may have a potential conflict in enforcing the
fornication law.
Id. (Birch, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
132. David G. Savage, High Court Rejects Appeal of a Lesbian Denied a Job; Law: Attorney
had been Promiseda Full-Time Government Position. But Offer Was Withdrawn when She Said
She Planned to 'Marry' Another Woman, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1998, at A10,available at 1998
WL 2388286 ("Georgia also has a law against adultery, and last year, Bowers admitted he has
carried on a long affair with a woman who is not his wife."); see also Frost, supra note 130, at
83-84 ("One might just as easily assume that the Attorney General would resist enforcing
Georgia's law against adultery. Michael Bowers announced during his campaign for governor
that he had participated in a decade-long adulterous affair with a woman who had been a
Department employee.") (footnote omitted).
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Eleventh Circuit decision was issued, 133 undercutting even further the
34
reason for Shahar's firing.'
One confusing issue raised in Shahar involves the conditions under
which religious considerations can permissibly motivate behavior by a
state representative. Consider Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
City of Hialeah,135 in which the Court struck down a prohibition of
animal sacrifice precisely because the state was trying to restrict
religious practices of the Santerfa. 136 The Court noted that the
"principle that government may not enact laws that suppress religious
belief or practice is so well understood that few violations are recorded
in our opinions."13' 7 When explaining why the statute at issue offended
the "constitutional protection for free exercise of religion,"' 138 the
Supreme Court pointed to statements by council members that the
practice violated Biblical teachings,' 39 and that this religion was "a sin,
'foolishness,' 'an abomination to the Lord,' and the worship of
'demons." ' 14 It would not have been a surprise if Shahar's religious
14 1
practices had elicited similar reactions.
Of course, the mere fact that the practices of Santerfa violated the
religious beliefs of the council members did not preclude the state from
regulating those practices. The Court has made clear that merely
because a religion has a particular practice does not entail that the state
must permit that practice.
For example, the Court upheld the
142
permissibility of prohibiting polygamy, notwithstanding the former
133. See Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998).
134. See Frost, supra note 130, at 95 ("Now, with no sodomy law to be violated, the
assumption of Shahar's law breaking could not stand."). But see supra notes 111-13 and
accompanying text (suggesting that the sodomy argument is specious in any event).
135. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
136. Id. at 526-28.
137. Id. at 523.
138. Id. at 531.
139. See id. at 541. "Councilman Mejides indicated that he was 'totally against the sacrificing
of animals' and distinguished kosher slaughter because it had a 'real purpose.' The 'Bible says
we are allowed to sacrifice an animal for consumption,' he continued, 'but for any other purposes,
I don't believe that the Bible allows that."' Id.
140. Id.
141. Cf. Mello, supra note 1,at 185 (citing Heather Stephenson, Big Crowd Rallies Against
Gay Marriage,RUTLAND HERALD, Feb. 2, 2001, at 1) (discussing those protesting outside the
Vermont statehouse when the Legislature was considering the civil unions bill-"'Speaker after
speaker said the legislature should follow 'God's law' and refuse to allow lesbians and gay men
to marry."').
142. See Toncray v. Budge, 95 P. 26, 37 (Idaho 1908).
[In the autumn of 1890, the president of the church, Wilford Woodruff, issued what
has been popularly known as the 'Manifesto,' whereby the church authorities
renounced the doctrine of bigamy and polygamy, and declared that it should no longer
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acceptance of that practice by the Church of Latter Day Saints. 143 As
the Court pointed out in Reynolds v. United States,144 a religious
acceptance of a wife's jumping on her deceased husband's funeral pyre
would not entail that the state would have to permit that practice.145
Thus, as suggested in Bowen v. Roy, 146 the Court has "long recognized a
distinction between the freedom of individual belief, which is absolute,
147
and the freedom of individual conduct, which is not absolute."'
Nonetheless, it is important to remember that the Court decided many
of the polygamy cases over a century ago. Arguably, the Court was not
as sensitive then to some of the concerns that are currently thought
148
important by the Court. For example, the Court in Davis v. Beason
made clear that it was not willing to treat the Mormon Church as it
would other religious groups. 149 The Court explained, that while
"legislation for the establishment of a religion is forbidden, and its free
exercise permitted, it does not follow that everything which may be so
called can be tolerated. Crime is not the less odious because sanctioned
by what any particular sect may designate as religion."' 510 Lest the
Court's meaning be misunderstood, the Court distinguished between a
religion on the one hand and a mere sect on the other.
The term 'religion' has reference to one's views of his relations
to his Creator, and to the obligations they impose of reverence
for his being and character, and of obedience to his will. It is
often confounded with the cultus or form of worship
of a
15 1
particular sect, but is distinguishable from the latter.
be a tenet of the church or of their religious faith or doctrine, and should not be taught
or practiced by it or any of its members or adherents.
Id.
143. One sect of Mormons has not accepted that renunciation. See Cleveland v. United States,
329 U.S. 14, 16 (1946) ("Petitioners are members of a Mormon sect, known as Fundamentalists.
They not only believe in polygamy; unlike other Mormons, they practice it.") (footnote omitted);
see also Barlow v. Blackburn, 798 P.2d 1360, 1361 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) ("Fundamentalist
Mormons believe that their religion requires the practice of polygamy.").
144. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
145. See id. at 166 ("[I]f a wife religiously believed it was her duty to burn herself upon the
funeral pile of her dead husband, would it be beyond the power of the civil government to prevent
her carrying her belief into practice?").
146. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
147. Id. at 699.
148. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890), overruled by Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620
(1996).
149. Id. at 341-43 (stating that bigamy and polygamy are crimes in all civilized and Christian
countries and that the "exercise of religion" must be "subordinate to the criminal laws of the
country").
150. Id. at 345.
151. Id. at 342.
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It is quite clear that the Court would not currently dismiss religious
practices so cavalierly. 152 As the Court suggested in Fowler v. Rhode
Island,153 "it is no business of courts to say that what is a religious
practice or activity for one group is not religion under the protection of
the First Amendment."' 154 Further, it would no longer suffice, as it once
did, for the Court to suggest that a practice might be prohibited because
it was "contrary to the spirit of Christianity and of the civilization which
Christianity has produced in the Western world."1 55
When upholding the constitutionality of polygamy prohibitions, the
Court has offered a variety of reasons, some helpful and others not. For
example, the Reynolds Court pointed out, "[p]olygamy has always been
odious among the northern and western nations of Europe, and, until the
establishment of the Mormon Church, was almost exclusively a feature
of the life of Asiatic and of African people."' 156 Yet, this is hardly a
reason to prevent a practice, 157 as there might be a variety of Asian or
African practices that would be beneficial to emulate. 158 The Davis
Court came closer to giving a reason when it suggested that polygamy
"tend[s] to destroy the purity of the marriage relation, to disturb the
peace of families, to degrade woman, and to debase man." 159 Here, the
Court might have had in mind that polygamy would have a destabilizing

152. Of course, that does not mean that the state would therefore protect minority religious
practices. See Jesse H. Choper, A Century of Religious Freedom, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1709, 1724
(2000) ("[T]he current Court is less separationist than in the past. This has resulted in its
becoming more accommodationist toward the 'major' or 'mainstream' religions, namely the
dominant Judeo-Christian faiths."); cf. Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and
the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1129 (1990) (suggesting that Court rhetoric leaves
it "open to the charge of abandoning its traditional role as protector of minority rights against
majoritarian oppression").
153. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953).
154. Id. at 70.
155. Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S.
1, 49 (1890).
156. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).
157. See PEGGY COOPER DAVIS, NEGLECTED STORIES THE CONSTITUTION AND FAMILY
VALUES 241 (1997) ("[Wie must be wary of the cultural myopia that informed the Justices'
thinking in Reynolds.").
158. See MARK STRASSER, THE CHALLENGE OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FEDERALIST
PRINCIPLES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS 14 (1999). "[Mjarital unions should not be
prohibited merely because European countries do not permit them. When something as important
as marriage is at issue, the justifications for a marriage ban should indicate with some specificity
the harms that will thereby be prevented." Id.
159. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 341 (1890), overruled by Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620
(1996).
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effect if, for example, a husband secured a second wife without the
consent of his first wife. 160
B. The Substantial ThreatPrinciple
When attempting to justify the permissibility of prohibiting
polygamy, the Reynolds Court did more than merely discuss the
practices of northern and western European nations; it in addition
suggested that polygamy is incompatible with democracy. 16' That
thesis has received support in the secondary literature, 162 and has been
cited approvingly by Justice Souter in his Hialeah concurrence in which
he suggested that Reynold's claim that "polygamy leads to the
patriarchal principle, and ... fetters the people in stationary
despotism"' 163 is "consistent with the principle that religious conduct
may be regulated by general or targeting law only if the conduct
'pose[s] some substantial threat to public safety, peace or order." ' 164
The substantial threat principle is important to consider because it
limits the conditions under which the state can prohibit religious
practices.
That principle suggests that a religious practice of
recognizing same-sex marriage should be prohibited only if it can be
shown to pose that level of danger to the public welfare. Further, it will
not do to argue that because polygamy may be prohibited, same-sex
marriages may be prohibited too, because the former may well be
viewed as more harmful than the latter. 165 Indeed, once Vermont has
160. See State v. Musser, 175 P.2d 724 (Utah 1946), vacated and remanded by 333 U.S. 95
(1948) (discussing polygamous marriage contracted against first wife's wishes which eventually
lead to divorce); see also David L. Chambers, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage,26 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 53, 65-66 (1997) (noting a higher rate of divorce among Mormons in the late 1800's than in
the general population).
161. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 165-66.
Upon [marriage] society may be said to be built, and out of its fruits spring social
relations and social obligations and duties, with which government is necessarily
required to deal. In fact, according as monogamous or polygamous marriages are
allowed, do we find the principles on which the government of the people, to a greater
or less extent, rests. Professor Lieber says, polygamy leads to the patriarchal principle,
and which, when applied to large communities, fetters the people in stationary
despotism, while that principle cannot long exist in connection with monogamy.
Id.
162. See, e.g., Maura I. Strassberg, Distinctionsof Form or Substance: Monogamy, Polygamy
and Same-Sex Marriage,75 N.C. L. REV. 1501 (1997).
163. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 569 (1993)
(Souter, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citing Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166).
164. Id. (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citing Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963)).
165. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 651 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Has the Court
concluded that the perceived social harm of polygamy is a 'legitimate concern of government,'
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had a few years experience with civil unions without falling apart, it
will be even clearer that the state would not be endangered were same66
sex marriages recognized.1
The point here is not to debate whether polygamy promotes
despotism, is a substantial threat to the public welfare, or even whether
it may be prohibited by the states without offending constitutional
guarantees. 167 For purposes here, the important point is that in recent
times when courts have examined the constitutionality of polygamy
restrictions, they have not simply said, for example, that marriage is by
definition the union of one man and one woman and thus polygamy
may of course be prohibited without offending constitutional
guarantees. Rather, the courts have instead closely examined the
restriction to see whether it passes constitutional muster, recognizing
that because the right to marry is of fundamental importance, the state
must establish that its prohibition of polygamy is narrowly tailored to
promote compelling state interests. Thus, a Utah federal district court
held that the state had a compelling interest in prohibiting plural
marriages 168 and, further, that the prohibition of such unions was
169
narrowly tailored to promote that state interest.
It is possible that a court imposing the compelling interest test might
in fact find that same-sex marriage bans are constitutionally
permissible. However, there is reason to doubt such a claim. For
example, a Hawaii court examined that state's marital law in light of

and the perceived social harm of homosexuality is not? ... I strongly suspect that the answer to
the last question is yes.").
166. Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Promo Homo: The Sedimentation of Antigay Discourse
and the ChannelingEffect of JudicialReview, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1327, 1395-96 (2000).
In the wake of Baker and Vermont's recognition of same-sex civil unions, there will be
pressure on other gay-tolerant states to offer similar benefits, either legislatively or
through judicial constructions of state constitutions. This will be particularly attractive
if the law survives and the state's experience with recognized same-sex unions is
favorable: A modest number of lesbian and gay couples will sign up; pleasant tourists
will enter and enrich the state; and God will not send the locusts upon the state, nor
will the institution of marriage suffer one whit.
Id.
167. Cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 247 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("What we
do today, at least in this respect, opens the way to give organized religion a broader base than it
has ever enjoyed; and it even promises that in time Reynolds will be overruled.").
168. See Potter v. Murray City, 585 F. Supp. 1126, 1138 (D. Utah 1984).
169. Id. at 1140 ("There appear to the court to be no reasonable alternatives to the prohibition
of the practice of polygamy to meet the compelling state interest found in the maintenance of the
system of monogamy upon which its social order is now based.").
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this very demanding test and held that the state law failed to meet the
relevant standard. 70 An Alaska court utilized a similar analysis.' 7 '
Commentators might point out that as of this date neither Alaska nor
Hawaii recognizes same-sex marriage. Yet, that is not because the
courts misapplied the relevant tests but instead because the state
constitutions upon which those decisions were based were themselves
themselves became
changed so that the same-sex marriage prohibitions
72
immune from state constitutional challenge. 1
Consider Baker v. State, 173 in which the Vermont Supreme Court
held that same-sex couples could not be deprived of the rights and
obligations of marriage.174 That ruling was based on a standard that is
much less strict than the one described above. 175 These decisions at
least suggest that a law banning same-sex marriage would not survive
constitutional scrutiny were the analysis usually imposed for marital
restrictions in fact employed.
It might seem surprising to suggest that First Amendment religious
guarantees protect the right to marry a same-sex partner, since the Court
seems to have limited the force of the First Amendment protections of
religion. In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v.
Smith, 176 the Court suggested that "the First Amendment bars
application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously
motivated action ... [only when] the Free Exercise Clause in
conjunction with other constitutional protections" have been
implicated. 177 Thus, Smith suggests that the Free Exercise Clause will
not invalidate a neutral, generally applicable law which limits religious
action unless that law also implicates other constitutional protections.
Yet, a same-sex marriage ban does not only involve the Free Exercise
Clause but, in addition, the right to marry 178 or, perhaps, the right to
170. Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996).
171. See Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska
Super. Feb. 27, 1998) (concluding there is a fundamental right to choose a partner and remanding
the case on the compelling state interest issue).
172. Stephen Buttry, Legal Test Predicted For 416 Court Challenge Would Be First For a
Same-Sex Marriage Ban Initiative 416 Text, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Oct. 16, 2000, available
at 2000 WL 4376128 ("Hawaii and Alaska voters essentially overruled their Supreme Courts by
adopting constitutional amendments limiting marriage to a man and a woman.").
173. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
174. Id. at 886-87.
175. See supra note 79 (discussing the level of scrutiny used in Baker).
176. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
177. Id. at 881.
178. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of the right to
marry).
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intimate association. 1 79 Indeed, it has been suggested that the Smith
hybrid rule does much less work than some on the Court seem to think,
since in many, if not most, Free Exercise cases it should not be difficult
to argue that additional constitutional protections are implicated as
well. 8 0
Justice O'Connor has suggested that the Free Exercise Clause "is best
understood as an affirmative guarantee of the right to participate in
religious practices and conduct without impermissible governmental
interference, even when such conduct conflicts with a neutral, generally
When one further considers that "the First
applicable law."'18 1
Amendment was enacted precisely to protect the rights of those whose
religious practices are not shared by the majority and may be viewed
with hostility,"' 182 the Free Exercise claim that same-sex marriages must
be permitted is more difficult to dismiss than is generally appreciated.
C. Vermont's Civil Union Statute
If indeed the First Amendment requires that states afford recognition
to same-sex relationships, some analysis is still required to determine
whether a state that recognizes civil unions has thereby met its
constitutional burden. The Vermont Legislature's decision to recognize
civil union status was reached only after the Vermont Supreme Court
had at least implicitly suggested that it would recognize same-sex
marriages if the state did not recognize some sort of status that would
afford same-sex couples the rights and obligations of marriage.

179. See Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1126 (11th Cir. 1997) (Birch, J., dissenting)
(discussing "Shahar's intimate association claim").
180. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 567 (1993)
(Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
If a hybrid claim is simply one in which another constitutional right is implicated, then
the hybrid exception would probably be so vast as to swallow the Smith rule, and,
indeed, the hybrid exception would cover the situation exemplified by Smith, since free
speech and associational rights are certainly implicated in the peyote ritual. But if a
hybrid claim is one in which a litigant would actually obtain an exemption from a
formally neutral, generally applicable law under another constitutional provision, then
there would have been no reason for the Court in what Smith calls the hybrid cases to
have mentioned the Free Exercise Clause at all.
Id. (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see also McConnell, supra
note 152, at 1122 ("Why isn't Smith itself a 'hybrid' case? Whatever else it might accomplish,
the performance of a sacred ritual like the ingestion of peyote communicates, in a rather dramatic
way, the participants' faith in the tenets of the Native American Church.").
181. City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 546 (1997) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
182. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 902 (1990) (O'Connor,
J., concurring in the judgment).
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When creating the special civil union status, the Legislature made
quite clear that civil unions were not marriages. 183 Notwithstanding that
declaration, there was a backlash against some legislatures by voters
who objected to the creation of this status.' 84 Although it seems safe to
say that there would have been an even greater backlash had the
Legislature instead amended that state's marriage laws to permit same185
sex couples to marry.
Two of the candidates in the 2000 presidential election publicly
endorsed the notion of same-sex unions for same-sex couples, 186 while
at the same time suggesting that marriage should be reserved for
different-sex couples. Given that those contracting civil unions have the
same rights and obligations as do those contracting marriages, 187 an
explanation is needed as to why a separate status should be created.
Such an explanation would presumably have at least two components:
(1) why such a status should be created at all, and (2) why a separate
status should be created when the marriage laws could instead easily be
modified to include same-sex couples.
D. Reasons to Accord Marriage-LikeRights and Obligations
There are a number of reasons why such a status might be conferred.
It might be in response to recognition by a court that equal protection
guarantees require at the very least that such a status be conferred. 188 It
might also involve recognition by a state legislature that same-sex
183. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201(4) (Lexis Supp. 2000) ("'Marriage' means the legally
recognized union of one man and one woman.").
184. Elizabeth Mehren, Campaign 2000 Voters Oust 5 Who Backed Vt. Civil Union Law
Politics: Republicans All, They Fall Victim In Primary Election To A Backlash Against Same-Sex
Domestic Partnerships. But Deep Divisions Remain, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2000, at A23,
available at 2000 WL 25896461 ("In a clear expression of backlash against the nation's first
same-sex domestic partnership law, five incumbent Republicans who supported Vermont's civil
union legislation were defeated Tuesday in that state's primary.").
185. Compare Questions Asked In Poll, ASSOCIATED PRESS (AP) NEWSWIRES, Jan. 24, 2000
(finding more support civil unions than support same-sex marriages), with David Gram, Exit Poll:
Slight Majority Supports Civil Unions, ASSOCIATED PRESS (AP) NEWSWIRES, Nov. 8, 2000
("The civil unions backlash that only sort of happened may be explained in part by an exit poll
that found a narrow majority of Vermonters supporting the new law.").
186. See Ovetta Wiggins, Abortion, Gay Rights Are Hot Potatoes CandidatesAvoid Speaking
on Issues, REC. (Northern New Jersey), Oct. 16, 2000, at A01, available at 2000 WL 15836186
(suggesting that both Nader and Gore support same-sex civil unions).
187. But see generally Mark Strasser, Mission Impossible: On Baker, Equal Benefits, and the
Imposition of Stigma, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1 (2000) (arguing that civil unions do not
afford equal benefits in the interstate context).
188. The Baker decision was based on the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont
Constitution, which is the "counterpart [of] the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution." Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 870 (Vt. 1999).
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couples have the same needs and interests as do different-sex couples,
and that the state should provide a status which would help fill those
needs and protect those interests.189 On these kinds of analyses, the
status would be afforded because of the individual needs, desires, and
interests that were implicated.
Or, a much different analysis might also be offered. Such a status
might be created and conferred out of a recognition that the societal
interests served by the state's recognizing such a status for different-sex
couples-providing a setting for the raising of the young; providing a
method whereby the distribution of assets will be organized should the
relationship end; supporting an institution whereby individuals might be
happier and more productive, thereby benefiting society as a whole as
well as the individuals themselves-are also served by recognizing such
a status for same-sex couples.' 9 On this kind of analysis, recognition
of a marriage-like status for same-sex couples would promote the
general welfare.
The recognition that similar societal interests would be served by
affording legal recognition of same-sex unions at least implicitly
recognizes that the same-sex couples upon whom that status might be
conferred are similar in important ways to different-sex couples. Were
the couples so different that the relevant interests would not be served
by affording that status, then there presumably would be little reason to
afford that status.
One of the reasons that there has been a partial transformation in the
debate regarding lesbian/gay/bisexual/transgender rights is that the
rights sought would not even be desirable were the stereotypes of
lesbian/gay/bisexual/transgendered people accurate. For example, were
it true that "those" people only sought anonymous sexual encounters
19 1
and were not interested in having meaningful long-term relationships,

189. See Frost, supra note 130, at 73.
Despite prohibitive legislation, gay and lesbian couples continue to marry. The
significance of marriage in our society can hardly be overstated. Marriage carries with
it considerable recognition in social, religious, economic and political spheres of life.
People marry for many reasons: to enter into a committed relationship with one
another, to signify to family, friends and acquaintances the nature of the relationship, to
follow the teachings of one's religion, to provide for one's spouse financially, and to
care for and make decisions on behalf of one another.
Id.
190. See STRASSER, supra note 158, at 2-5 (discussing the state interests in marriage).
191. See Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250, 263 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) (suggesting that
there is insufficient evidence to establish that same-sex relationships are short-lived and shallow);
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylegal Narratives, 46 STAN. L. REV. 607, 625 (1994) (discussing
"the stereotype that gay men are 'promiscuous"'); Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche
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it would not make sense to seek the right to marry except, perhaps, as a
way of achieving other goals. The same might be said of parental
rights. Were lesbian/gay/bisexual/transgendered people not having and
raising children and not wanting to have children to raise, 192 the desire
to have parental rights recognized and respected would be hard to
fathom except, perhaps, instrumentally.
At the same time that the presidential candidates were claiming that
lesbian/gay/bisexual/transgendered individuals should have a status
affording them all of the rights and obligations of marriage, they also
were asserting that marriage should be reserved for different-sex
couples. 193 The question then becomes why a "separate but equal"
status should be conferred.
E. The Meaning of Civil Unions
While lesbian/gay/bisexual/transgendered people are viewed as less
foreign than they were once thought to be, it is clear that the creation of
civil unions-a "separate but equal" status-communicates at least two
additional messages. First, it suggests that same-sex relationships are
not as good as different-sex relationships. 194 Indeed, same-sex marriage
opponents do not even attempt to mask their view that society must not
view same-sex unions as on a par with different-sex unions. 195 Second,
it suggests that same-sex unions are somehow an affront to religious
principles, notwithstanding that some religions recognize such unions.
The very term "civil union" suggests that while the union may be
recognized by the state, it certainly should not be recognized as having

Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protectionfor Lesbians and Gay
Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511, 538 (1992) (discussing claim that lesbians and gays are
"promiscuous, predatory, and obsessed with sex"); Stephen Macedo, Homosexuality and the
Conservative Mind, 84 GEo. L.J. 261, 284 (1995) (discussing sweeping generalizations falsely
depicting all gay men as promiscuous).
192. See STRASSER, supra note 48, at ch. 4 (discussing lesbian and gay adoption and raising
of children).
193. See Suzanne Fields, Editorial, Ralph Nader Is Steadfast In His Views And Idealism,
GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Nov. 5, 2000, at D3, available at 2000 WL 29126858 ("NOW joins the
Human Rights Campaign, the gay advocacy lobby, in criticizing Mr. Nader, a bachelor, for not
forcefully advocating same-sex marriage, even though he does support 'gay civil unions .... ');
Christopher Heredia, Gay Community's Reminder-Not Everyone's for Gore, S.F. CHRON., Nov.
3, 2000, at A3, available at 2000 WL 6495881 (discussing Gore's support for civil unions but
opposition to gay marriages).
194. See Cox, supra note 1, at 135 ("Not until same-sex couples obtain the freedom to marry
will what remains 'a condition of legal inferiority' be lifted from us.").
195. See, e.g., Duncan, supra note 91, at 239-40 (discussing the "radical and dangerous
agenda" which seeks to "reflect the equal goodness of homosexuality and heterosexuality").
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any spiritual significance. 196 Indeed, the language describing the
process by which these unions are recognized says a great deal, since
different-sex couples' marriages are "solemnized" and same-sex
couples' civil unions are "certified."' 197
V.

CONCLUSION

No state currently recognizes same-sex marriages, notwithstanding
the state and individual interests that would be promoted by such a
recognition. Some suggest that same-sex marriage is anathema to those
who are religious. However, given that some religions sanctify such
unions, the most that can be said is that same-sex marriage is anathema
to some but not other religions.
The fact that some religions recognize such unions has much more
import than merely undermining the claimed consensus view that such
unions should not be permitted. In addition, a strong argument can be
made that, at least for some couples, such unions must be recognized
because of the Free Exercise guarantees of the Federal Constitution.
Were the appropriate level of scrutiny employed to determine whether
the state could justify interfering with this religious practice, the state
would never be able to establish that such a ban is justified.
The creation of civil unions is important for a variety of reasons,
because the recognition of such a status at the same time suggests that
individuals with a same-sex orientation are not as different as they were
once thought to be and that unions for same-sex couples serve many of
the same state and individual interests that are served by marriage for
different-sex couples. Yet, the creation of this separate status also
makes clear that society believes that same-sex couples do not deserve
the same status and respect as do other members of the community.
One issue is whether it is permissible for the state to impose a stigma
on one group out of deference to the religious or non-religious
sensibilities of another. Scholars will debate that point. A different
issue is whether the state can interfere with a religious practice like
marriage without a showing of the substantial harm that would likely be

196. Cf. Fisher v. Fisher, 324 N.W.2d 582, 583-84 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (distinguishing
between a couple's "ecclesiastical union" and their "civil union").
Greg Johnson does not seem to appreciate this. See Johnson, supra note 2, at 43 ("Civil union,
on the other hand, seems to successfully capture the spiritual aspect of the relationship.").
197. Mello, supra note 1, at 251. "The bill also distinguished between the terminology for the
rites and rituals that symbolize the two classes of unions, heterosexual and homosexual.
Marriages of heterosexuals are 'solemnized.' Unions of homosexuals would be 'certified' by
judges or clergy members." Id.
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caused without such a prohibition. The state has not yet offered
justifications for its same-sex marriage bans which have survived even
heightened scrutiny. Thus, it is unlikely that the stricter test normally
imposed for violations of Free Exercise would permit the state to
maintain such a ban.
The separate status of civil unions and, even more so, the refusal to
give legal recognition to same-sex relationships communicate an
attitude of inequality which would be viewed as intolerable in most
other contexts. One can only guess how long this double standard will
remain, although if events of the last few years are any indication, it
may remain for a much shorter period than would have been imaginable
a mere decade ago.

